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PHILOSOPHERS HAVE sometimes divided human experiences into 
two major kinds: those predominantly of activity on the part of the 
agent. and those predominantly of passivity. As passive, man is an 
observer, contemplator, scientist, chronicler of events, or prophet. 
As active. man is an agent who directs human affairs, changes na-
ture, formulates policies concerning people, institutions. rules, cus-
toms, courses of action, and so on. We need not inquire whether 
this division is very happy. The important observation is that a 
person can play either role with intelligence and sophistication, or 
on the other hand with stupidity and naivete. Certain branches of 
philosophy are devoted roughly to the job of determining how a 
person may conduct his passive role. as contemplator, with intelli-
gence and reason. These are epistemology, logic, and the philosophy 
of science, doubtless among others. In contrast to them, ethics or 
moral philosophy has been the philosophical discipline devoted pri-
marily to the job of determining how to conduct the active role 
with intelligence and reason. At least we can say this as a first ap-
proximation. 
Let us now address ourselves to a very broad question: What kind 
of reasoning may show how to conduct our active role with intelli-
gence, and how far may we expect such reasoning to take us? I sup-
pose a person's answer to this question constitutes a good part of his 
view about the content of moral philosophy. 
I shall begin by stating what I believe to be part of the right 
answer to this broad question. But I shall not attempt to develop 
or defend this answer in detail. For the primary aim of my remarks 
is to criticize another answer, a much more familiar answer. Ac-
cording to this second answer. which I wish to criticize, reasoning 
aimed to conduct our active role intelligently- the substantive 
part of moral philosophy- must begin with a description of ordi-
nary moral questions, of the language of morals (a pan of what is 
often called "metaethics"), and only on the basis of conclusions as 
to the meaning of ordinary moral questions should one attempt the 
traditional job of answering these questions. What I wish to show 
is that this familiar view is mistaken in the role it gives to the ex-
amination of ordinary moral language in the activity of guiding 
decisions intelligently. 
I 
LET ME BEGIN BY urging that moral philosophy has two main, 
and closely related, jobs. The first is to determine which policies, 
preferences, or attitudes are rational for everybody. "Rational" in 
what sense? "Rational" for a person in the sense that he would 
adopt them if he was in a normal frame of mind and was perfectly 
knowledgeable- that is, had at his disposal and vividly in mind all 
available relevant knowledge about himself and the world and was 
making no logical mistake. What might be an example of a policy 
or preference that is rational for everybody, in this sense of "ra-
tional"? It is not implausible to suggest that it is rational in this 
sense to prefer knowledge to ignorance, or pleasure to pain. I shall 
give attention to one particular example in a moment. 
There is a second and related job. This is to give instructions to 
persons how they may find what is a rational policy for them to 
adopt, a rational preference for them, in this same sense of "rational," 
where it is doubtful whether it can be shown that a given policy or 
preference is rational for everybody. Such instructions hopefully 
would also be useful in helping a person find the rational decision 
in specific situations with which philosophy as a discipline can 
hardly be concerned. 
If such jobs are the main jobs of moral philosophy, one may 
claim that moral philosophy is a perfectly objective discipline. It is 
not just a matter of proclaiming one's own precious values to the 
world at large, but rather of determining which attitudes or pref-
erences would be adopted by persons who were normal and perfectly 
knowledgeable, and of getting clear how to determine what one's 
own attitude or preference would be if one were perfectly knowl-
edgeable and in a normal frame of mind. These questions are 
perfectly clear, and presumably can be answered by broadly rational 
and scientific procedures. We may concede that it may be a difficult 
matter to get the answers, and that such questions perhaps cannot 
be answered with certainty or even, in many cases, with a high de-
gree of probability. 
Anyone who suggests that such a program is at least a large part 
of the proper program for moral philosophy must answer various 
objections. It will be worth while to consider briefly three of these, 
before turning to a critique of the established 1heory. 
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The first objection is that the proposal, as stated, appears not 
even to attempt an answer to some central questions to which moral 
philosophy has traditionally addressed itself, and which are urgent 
questions for practical life. Our proposal that moral philosophy 
should concern itself with finding rational preferences or attitudes, 
it will be said, does come close to suggesting a way to answer the tra-
ditional question of the good, or the question of a wise or prudent 
choice; but even i£ we know what is the "rational" policy for a per-
son, we shall be no closer to knowing what is his duty or moral obli-
gation, and this is something moral philosophy most certainly is con-
cerned to determine. Nor, again, will we know, by knowing what is 
"rational" policy, what conduct is morally praiseworthy or blame-
worthy. It is no answer to questions about such issues, to tell us 
what a person would prefer, or what policy he would adopt, if he 
were perfectly knowledgeable and in a normal frame of mind. 
This point is an important one, and the objection would be 
fatal i£ it cannot be met. But fortunately the objection rests on a 
misunderstanding, that of too narrow a conception o£ the types o£ 
situation which constitute problems for human beings, and about 
which they have to make choices and adopt policies. It is true that 
talk of rational choice or preference suggests a situation of deciding 
what is for one's own interest or personal advantage in a particular 
situation. But there are much larger issues with respect to which 
we must form preferences and make choices. For there are social 
customs and moral rules and laws; and sometimes we are called upon 
to decide which o£ these we shall support, advocate, or join with 
others in promoting. When this happens the question arises: Which 
customs, or moral rules, or laws are ones which a given person must 
rationally prefer- or, more important, which ones are qualified 
to commend themselves to every rational person who is living in a 
society? And, for persons of good will, a still narrower question will 
arise: What rules or laws would a rational person wish to see written 
in the consciences o£ men or the legal institutions of his society if 
he were also a person of a normal degree of altruism or concern for 
the welfare of other persons? Now these questions are at least very 
like the questions people raise when they ask what is obligatory or 
right or one's duty, in the ordinary senses of these words. Or at 
least it is arguable that what is clear and important in the questions 
"What is the right thing to do?" and "What is my duty in these cir-
cumstances?" and "Which action, if any, is morally obligatory in 
these circumstances?" could be phrased either as one of the forego-
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ing questions about what choice would be rationally preferable, 
or as a minor modification of one of these. There is another kind 
of question. This is the question of what attitude or public policy 
it is rational to adopt toward persons who have disobeyed laws or 
rational social rules, and so on-or of what attitude or policy 
it would be rational for persons with a normal degree of altruism 
to adopt. And this question is at least very like the question people 
raise when they ask whether the conduct of a person was morally 
blameworthy in the circumstances; or at least it is arguable that it 
captures all that is clear and important in such a question. 
It is incidentally worth notice that there is a sense in which 
rational policies for these various types of situation may conflict. 
For it might be rational, in our sense, for me to prefer one course 
of action in a certain situation, although this course of action is for-
bidden by a moral rule it is rational for me to support, or at least 
which it would be rational for me to support if I had a normal de· 
gree of altruism. Again, it might be rational for me to perform a 
certain action the condemnation or even punishment of which 
would be decreed by social rules or laws which I must rationally 
support, or at any rate must rationally support if I have a normal 
share of altruism. Such confiicts, I think, do exist and are an im-
portant problem for moral philosophy; it is not merely, as some 
philosophers seem to think, that only confused philosophers think 
there are such problems. 
My answer to the first objection, then, in sum is this. The charge 
is that if we construe the job of moral philosophy as that of de-
termining which attitudes or policies are rational in the sense eX-
plained, then all the different problems of the moral life are made 
to collapse into one problem, that of fixing what is to the self·in-
terest of the agent. My reply is that this charge ignores the fact 
that we are called upon to make many types of choices, and among 
them the decision whether we shall give our support to certain moral 
rules, or to their being written into laws and into the consciences of 
men. And my suggestion is that when we see that there are these 
various choices, we can see that the proposal after all does preserve 
an interest in the various problems of the moral life. I have not, of 
course, touched upon all the various traditional questions of moral 
philosophy- for instance, that of the fair or just. 
There is a second charge which may be levelled against the 
present suggestion about the tasks of moral philosophy. It will be 
said that at least the first suggested job, that of determining which 
7 
attitudes would be adopted by everyone who was knowledgeable 
about the world and himself, is a vain one. For, it will be said, 
there are no attitudes or preferences about which we can say that 
they would be adopted by et1ery knowledgeable and normal person. 
For do we not know that any conceivable attitude or policy would 
be reasonable provided a person's basic values were of an appro-
priate kind, and do we not know that any basic value is possible'? 
Surely there is no such thing as the rational attitude toward any-
thing. 
We must distinguish, however, between the logically possible 
and the causally possible. Given that there is no contradiction in 
supposing that a knowledgeable person have a certain attitude, it 
may still be causally impossible for a knowledgeable person to have 
that attitude, if he is in a normal frame of mind. I do not mean 
by this merely that we should be unwilling to say that a person was 
in a "normal" frame of mind if he was both knowledgeable and had 
a certain attitude, although in some cases this may be true. I rather 
have in mind, for one thing, the possibility that an analysis of what 
it is to choose or form a preference is such as to exclude the possi-
bility of certain preferences. I have in mind, for another thing, the 
possibility that certain attitudes will be inevitable in persons whose 
cognitive orientations are sound, whose past lives have included 
normal interactions with a family and other persons, and who are 
free of distortions produced by fear and anxiety. To suggest this 
is to make a large and programmatic claim. I do not pretend that 
we actually have much knowledge of this sort. To make the claim 
stick would require, for one thing, a systematic philosophical psy-
chology. Let me, however, for the benefit of the sceptical, present 
one example of what I have in mind. Some philosophers, for ex-
ample Sidgwick, have argued that it would be irrational for a per-
son to prefer what he regarded as a smaller good to what he re-
garded as a larger one just because the smaller one could be attained 
today rather than tomorrow. To be more explicit, suppose that, 
if the choice between having either A or B today were presented 
to a person, he would take A in preference to B. The question then 
is whether a rational person would still prefer A to B, if the choice 
were between having A at one time and having B at a later time. 
To make the question sensible, of course, we have to lay down some 
restrictions. A sensible person will recognize that he may be dead 
tomorrow; there may also be an actual disutility in waiting; and so 
on. So we must modify our A and B so as to compensate for these 
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differences; or better, for purposes of simplicity, we should choose 
an A and B for circumstances such that these differences do not 
arise. Now I suggest that Sidgwick may have been correct if what 
he was arguing for was this: that no perfectly knowledgeable (etc.) 
human being would alter his preference for A over B (assuming 
these adjustments have been made or the need for them does not 
arise) purely because of the time at which these events would occur. 
Why not? When we prefer one thing to another, we prefer it as fall-
ing under some description, as something of a certain kind. Now, 
if a person did alter his preference solely because of the time, 
it must be because the description "an event A today" as compared 
with the description "an event A next week" elicits preference, even 
after the important differences, such as the possibility of death in 
the meantime, have been adjusted for. Is this possible for a rational 
person? I think it isn't. The time position of an event is something 
that can't make a difference to the motivating power of a concep-
tion, once it is clear to a person- as of course it is to a person who 
has the relevant facts vividly before him- that it is one and the 
same self that enjoys or undergoes the event at either time. The 
time at which an event occurs ex hypothesi does not affect the flavor 
or quality of the experience. The time of an event is qualityless; it 
is the fact of position in an order. So, if what elicits interest is the 
conceived quality of an event, as I incline to think it is, temporal 
position as such does not affect rational preference. So, if A is pre-
ferred to B now, a rational being, aware of the fact that the experi-
ences will be the same irrespective of the times at which they occur, 
'\rill still prefer A to B even if A is to come at a later date than B. 
The reason why some people prefer the nearer good to the further 
one, I suppose, is that they find it harder to imagine what it is like 
to get the good at a later time, or forget that it is they who after all 
will be enjoying the later experience. In so far they fall short of 
rationality. 
If this suggestion is correct, then there is one kind of preference 
which is necessary for a rational being. I suspect there are many 
more like it. 
To the second charge that there are no distinctively rational 
attitudes, then, my reply is that the charge seems formidable be-
cause attitudes are conceived in a logical vacuum, where everything 
is possible which is not self-contradictory. But, when we consider 
what human beings are, what choices and preferences are and what 
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it is to adopt them, we may see that many logical possibilities are 
not realized in fact. 
Let us look at a third charge. This is simply that it requires to 
be made out why, of all the jobs the moral philosopher might under. 
take, the one described has paramount claim on him. Is there any 
reason to suppose that the most important thing the moral philos. 
opher can do for practice is make clear which choices or preferences 
or attitudes are rational in the sense described? This is a question 
which will engage our attention later. But two points are worth 
our attention now. 
The first reply to it is a hypothetical statement. It is that if 
the job of the moral philosopher is to bring facts and logic to bear 
in the guidance of choice to a maximal extent, then the task as 
outlined must be the task of the moral philosopher. For to identify 
a principle of action or an attitude as "rational" in our sense is 
to show which choices or attitudes are the ones required by reason 
and fact in the sense that a person who was perfectly knowledgeable 
and had the relevant facts vividly before him and made no logical 
mistakes and was in a normal frame of mind would adopt them. 
To show what is the rational act or attitude precisely is to bring 
fact and reason to bear on the practical to a maximal extent. Simi· 
larly, if we cannot identify a choice or attitude as rational for every-
body, at least to show an individual how to ascertain which atti-
tudes of his are not excluded by considerations of reason, is again 
to do all that can be done in the way of bringing logic and facts 
to bear on choice. So, granted that the job of the moral philosopher 
is to bring fact and logic to bear in the guidance of choices, the 
philosopher's job would seem to be the one stated. 
A second reason why it is important for the moral philosopher 
to help get clear what is a rational preference in the sense ex-
plained is that a distinctive feature of knowing that a choice would 
be rational in this sense is that there can be no further ques. 
tion whether it is reasonable to make that choice. Knowing that a 
choice would be rational in our sense is therefore different from 
knowing, say, that a choice is one it is our duty to make; for a per-
son can still ask whether it is reasonable to do one's duty when it 
confticts, say, with self-interest. But if a man knows what he would 
choose if he had vividly in mind all the relevant facts about himself 
and the world and ·were in a normal frame of mind, the question 
whether it is rational for him to do this, at least in my sense of 
"rational," is devoid of all sense. Here I agree, I think, with what 
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W. D. Falk has often argued. It is true, o( course, that a person 
may believe some choice is rational in this sense and at the same 
time wonder whether it is his duty to make it or even if it is not his 
duty not to make it. I shall return to the question whether this 
fact raises a serious problem. It is also true that a man may believe 
some choice is reasonable in my sense but fail to make it: the alco· 
holic, for instance, may believe it is not a rational thing for him 
to take another drink, but may still go on and take it. The alcoholic's 
problem, however, is about motivation, not about what is reason-
able: what he needs is medical advice, or sympathy, or exhortation, 
not argument about what it is rational for him to do. 
II 
THE FOREGOING suGGESTION about the job o£ moral philosophy 
has to be appraised in view of another and different account. The 
remainder of my remarks will comprise a discussion and evalua· 
tion of this other view. 
This second view is that the natural starting-point of moral 
philosophy is the existence in ordinary language of certain terms, 
and the use in ordinary discourse of these terms in certain ques-
tions, all of which may be identified as "practical" terminology. 
There are such questions as: "What is desirable in itself?" "When is 
a ... a good ... ?" "When is a course of action the best one to 
choose [from the point of view of a particular person]?" .. When 
does a person have a moral obligation to do something?" "When is 
a situation or action just?" And so on. No one, of course, will deny 
that these are questions which people continually raise, or that 
they are important questions, or that they are questions which have 
occupied the center of the stage in much of the history of moral 
philosophy. 
Many philosophers have thought that the main job of philos-
ophy is the analysis of concepts, or of recurrent types of question-
and that the main job of the moral philosopher in particular is the 
analysis of terms, and questions, like those just mentioned. Just as, 
they have thought, the business of the philosopher is to analyze con-
cepts like Cause, Number, and Material Thing, so it is his business 
to analyze notions like Good, Right, and Responsibility. 
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Philosophers use the word "analyze" in more than one way. The 
analysis here in question is analysis in the sense of determining and 
describing or characterizing the actual meaning or use or effect of 
ethical words as they appear in ordinary language, not in the sense 
of making useful recommendations for change in meaning or use. 
The purpose of such a taxonomic inquiry is often simply the 
satisfaction of curiosity; it is of interest to distinguish and classify 
all different types of terms from both semantic and pragmatic points 
of view- as property-ascribing, or "performative," and so on. But 
the purpose is often also instrumental: the analysts have hoped to 
pave the way for more effective moral reasoning, and have envis-
aged the role of the philosopher as that of the clarifying midwife 
who helps answer questions by helping get the questions clear. For 
they suppose that, once it is clear what the ordinary man's ethical 
questions mean, or how they should be characterized, it will already 
be pretty clear how one should go about answering them, what 
methodology one may reasonably employ in finding the answers, or 
how a given alleged answer may be justified. Thus they suppose 
that the activity of analysis of ordinary ethical language, and the 
results of such analysis, set the stage for and are a necessary prepara-
tion for, the activity of normative reflection, that is, proposals for 
the answer of these questions, with supporting reasons. Philosophers 
sometimes do not think it the business of the philosopher to reach 
or defend any answers to normative questions at all, on the ground 
that this activity lies outside the domain of analysis of language, 
which is the proper business of philosophy; but many philosophers 
think that, if one is going to try to reach and defend normative con· 
elusions, one can proceed rationally only on the basis of conclusions 
about the meaning of ethical questions in ordinary discourse, and 
the implications for methodology laid down by these conclusions. 
This view I wish to question. 
This view, I say, is held by many philosophers. I suppose many 
or most contemporary naturalists view their conclusions about the 
meaning of ethical terms in ordinary language as a solid base for 
their normative discussions. For the result of any naturalistic analy-
sis of an ethical word like "good" is that at least one proposition 
connecting ethical and nonethical concepts is construed as true by 
definition, guaranteed by the very meaning of ethical terms in ordi-
nary discourse. Hence the naturalist's discussion of normative ques-
tions can begin with the guarantee, say, that an act is right if it will 
probably maximize happiness, or would be approved by an impar-
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tial, informed, and normal judge. It is not only naturalists, however, 
who think that reasoning in ethics has a basis of somewhat thiS 
kind, and that ethical thinking must acknowledge the epistemologi-
cal priority of analysis of meanings. Obviously nonnaturalist cog-
nitivist philosophers, like G. E. Moore, may hold that the analysis 
of ethical language shows that some important ethical statements 
are analytic, such as "An action is right if and only if it maximizes 
intrinsic value." But also noncognitivist philosophers, who deny 
that ethical words are property-ascribing, have supposed that the 
analysis of ordinary ethical language can give important guidance 
in the identification of sound ethical reasoning. Take for instance 
Stephen Toulmin. He denies that ethical words are property-ascrib-
ing, but he asserts as a point about English usage that a judgment 
is called "moral" or "ethical" only if it is used to avoid unnecessary 
suffering or increase deep satisfaction, in the speaker's community, 
by altering behavior or attitudes. This point about language forms 
the logical support for his conclusion that an ethical judgment is 
discharging its proper function only, roughly, if it can properly be 
taken as the logical consequence of the application of appropriate 
utilitarian premises to the situation. The analysis of language, then, 
is made to identify broadly utilitarian reasoning as sound reasoning 
in ethics. Much the same is true of R. M. Hare. In his recent book, 
Freedom and Reason, Hare commences with the thesis that ethical 
statements are to be construed roughly as imperative statements, 
prescriptions, addressed to everyone whose situation they may fit. 
"It is wrong to do A in circumstances C" means "Don't anyone in 
circumstances C ever do A!" From this equivalence Hare thinks we 
can infer how sound ethical reasoning must proceed, and to what 
extent and by what devices we may hope to meet the contentions of 
the Nazi or the segregationist. For, by the equivalence, to know 
whether something is wrong is to know whether one is prepared to 
proscribe it for everyone including one's self. Since one hardly 
knows whether he wants to proscribe something until he knows 
what it would be like for the proscription to be accepted, it is always 
a point relevant to the acceptance of a moral principle, what it 
would be like for the principle to be lived by universally. Relevant 
moral thinking is thus reOection on which proscriptions one wants 
universally accepted in view of what life would be like if they were 
so accepted. A moral judgment is as well justified as it can be if, in 
full view of what universal acceptance would be like, the speaker is 
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willing to issue the universal imperative which is identical in mean-
ing with the moral judgment. 
This way of looking at matters is an attractive one. In any area 
of discourse, if we wish to assess a given thesis, we had better first 
find out exactly what the thesis is, and then consider what are the 
grounds pro and con. Surely. it may seem, this must also be true for 
all value judgments. And, of course, the analysis of the meaning or 
use of ethical statements is something about which we ought to be 
able to get agreement, as much as on any subtle point of empirical 
science. For, despite the complications, determining the meaning or 
use of any sentence is essentially a scientific task, and we should ex-
pect eventually to be able to reach agreement about the matter. The 
analysis of ethical language, at least, is "value free," so that we can 
expect to get solid ground on which to work out what must be the 
methodology of normative ethics. 
I believe, however, that the expectation that the analysis of ordi-
nary language can thus set the stage for normative ethics is unduly 
optimistic, and a grave oversimplification of the facts. Most of the 
remainder of my remarks will be aimed at supporting this assess-
ment of the situation. 
Let me begin by considering a hypothetical example. Professor 
John Ladd once suggested that the central moral term of the Nava-
ho Indians is "bahadzid," which roughly is translated as "danger-
ous" or "imprudent." Now suppose we became convinced that this 
is the only term in the Navaho language which comes anywhere 
close to our ethical vocabulary. Would we think that the Navaho 
moral philosopher could properly confine himself to determining 
what actions are properly called "bahadzid"? 1 think we should 
answer in the negative. We should feel that. before one can think 
clearly about an action being dangerous or imprudent, we first need 
the concepts of desirable and undesirable states of affairs, indeed of 
the intrinsically desirable and undesirable. Again, we would think 
that there should be terminology available for classifying an action 
as beneficial or harmful from the point of view of the whole social 
group, and not merely from the point of view of the agent or his 
family group; or perhaps there should be terminology available for 
classifying acts as conforming to or infringing rules the acceptance 
of which as binding for all members of the group would be socially 
beneficial. If the Navaho do not have such terms, or raise such ques. 
tions. we should think: "So much the worse for them!" 
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This hypothetical example leads to the following question: 
When should a moral philosopher be satisfied with a given con-
ceptual network for ethics, including definitions or characteriza-
tions of the main terms in the system? I suggest that the answer is 
not: when the evidence is cogent that the conceptual network rep-
resents accurately the actual moral language of the community. ln 
contrast I suggest the following alternative: A moral philosopher 
should be satisfied with a conceptual framework if it enables him 
to raise all the questions concerning conduct and choice and pref-
erence he thinks it is important to raise and distinguish, in view ot 
his total understanding of moral discourse, human preferences, 
moral attitudes, of the function of all these in personal and social 
living; and if the procedure for answering questions about how to 
choose or act which is implied by his definitions or characterizations 
as being the proper procedure is all that he thinks can be or need be 
done to resolve questions about practice. More briefly, I suggest 
that a philosopher's satisfaction with a given set of conceptual tools 
for practical thinking should depend on his view of the distinct 
types of problem which life in society poses, and of ways of reason-
ing to resolve these problems which he thinks possible and finds 
satisfying. 
In saying this, I am happy to find myself in fairly near agree-
ment with various moral philosophers. R. B. Perry, with all his ob-
scurity about procedure in ethical theory, is a notable example. 
Perry said that the question is not how ethical words are used, for 
they are used confusedly, but how they are best used. W. K. Fran-
kena posed the issue more clearly, in advocating that the problems 
of metaethics demand for their solution "'clarity and decision' 
about the nature and function of morality, of moral discourse, and 
of moral theory . • :·• 
A philosopher who denies that the task of moral philosophy is 
primarily getting clear about the actual meanings or uses of ethical 
terms in ordinary discourse need not advocate that philosophy 
abandon the job of midwife in the practical thinking of ordinary 
people. For there is more than one way of clarifying ethical dis-
course. O.ne can do it by formulating explicitly what was implicit 
in a person's actual question. Or one can do it by showing that 
•In "Obligation and Motivation,'' in A. I. Melden (editor), Essays in Moral 
Philosophy_ (Seattle: University of Washington Preas, 1958). On p. 80 he notes 
comments by other philosophers who have made suggestions along the same Une, 
including c. L. Stevenson, P. H. Nowell·Smith, W. D. FaUc.. H. D. Aiken, and 
Philip R.ice. 
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his actual question is better dropped in favor of another but re-
lated question, which has more point. 
So far I have given no reason why moral philosophers should not 
found their normative reflections on an examination of ordinary 
ethical language. Why must they leave purely descriptive formula-
tions of linguistic habits for a more reconstructive enterprise? Why 
must a purely descriptive account of ordinary ethical discourse fail 
to set the stage for ethical methodology, or normative ethics, in the 
way many philosophers have envisaged? Let us look at some of the 
problems we face, if we choose a purely descriptive analysis of ordi-
nary language as the basis of our ethical methodology, in one of the 
fashions sketched above. 
First, the average person uses "good" or "obligatory," in the im-
portant contexts, without a definite intended meaning in mind. 
People do not have a conception of what it is to be good or obliga-
tory in the way they have a conception of what it is to be, say, a 
bachelor. Hence, whereas "All bachelors are unmarried" can be 
supported by appeal to inspection of conscious meanings, ethical 
first principles (except for trivial cases) cannot be. 
\Ve may concede to naturalism that there are some exceptions to 
this. For instance, if several persons are on a beach and looking for 
stones to skip, and someone calls "Here's a good one!'' his utterance 
perhaps just means "Here's one with the properties requisite for 
success in the present business." But there are many contexts, and 
among them the most important for practical decisions, in which 
the intended meanings are not so clear. Suppose a person asks 
whether it would be a good thing to make certain sacrifices in order 
to give himself time to develop some original ideas in philosophy. 
Or suppose a person asks if a system of slavery must be wrong be. 
cause unjust, even in circumstances in which a slave system would 
benefit the society. In such cases, it seems the ordinary person does 
not have any intended meaning close to the surface, in the way he 
has it for the example above; hence the intended meaning will 
not support a claim for the analyticity of a corresponding ethical 
generalization. Perhaps the usage of some persons is an exception 
to this judgment. Jeremy Bentham, for instance, as a result of long 
preaching of his utilitarian system, may have meant exactly what he 
said he did; for him "is wrong" may have meant just "tends not to 
maximize utility." But such cases are exceptional; most persons are 
just puzzled if asked the meaning of their ethical terms, and look 
to the philosopher for light on the meaning of their own ethical 
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questions. So when Moore says that "right action" means "action 
which will maximize intrinsic good" or when Hare says that "A is 
wrong" means "Don't anyone ever do A!" they are not proposing 
expressions which most persons could properly classify as synonyms 
on the basis of inspection of their own consciously intended mean-
ings. 
Philosophers who think that analysis of actual meanings of 
ethical words can set the stage for normative reasoning in one of 
the ways suggested may not be fazed by the above contention, 
even if they accept it. They may be happy to reformulate their 
point in terms of "implicit meanings" instead of "consciously in-
tended meanings." They may say that what the ordinary man is 
doing with his ethical words is definite enough; the appearance of 
trouble arises only from the fact that he is unable to explain or 
characterize his own usage. He means something definite all right, 
but we must dig deeper to find it- as is true in many other areas 
of discourse. And we can find what he means by his terms, by notic-
ing the way in which he conducts inquiries, and by noting what he 
accepts as evidence or arguments pro or con. Such observations 
can provide a test for hypotheses about what he means by his ethical 
words. Hence, even when what he means by ethical words is not 
obvious to him on inspection of conscious meaning, we can properly 
talk of his "implicit" meaning, and draw inferences about the ana-
lyticity of some ethical principles, and so on, as suggested earlier. 
Implicit meanings are enough. 
This proposal leads to my second objection. This is that, even 
if we do not reject the whole concept of "implicit meanings" as du-
bious, the implicit meanings of ethical terms cannot function as a 
source for criticism of a person's ethical reflection or of his ethical 
principles. The reason is this. The proposal in question suggests 
that a theory about a person's implicit meanings is to be supported 
by appeal to the way in which he conducts ethical reflection, and by 
the ethical principles he takes for granted in his thinking. But then 
we cannot correct his modes of reflection and his ethical principles 
by appeal to his implicit meanings, for our judgment about his 
meaning is based on these. If his implicit meanings, according to 
our conclusion, are inconsistent with his modes of reflection or his 
ethical principles, what is shown is simply that our views about his 
meanings are unfounded. For instance, suppose G. E. Moore tried 
to reform a man's nonutilitarian ethical principles by appeal to his 
own meaning of "right." Moore would be arguing that the meaning 
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of "right" is "maximizes intrinsic value"; and it is true that if this 
is what one means by "right" it is inconsistent not to be a utili-
tarian. But Moore could hardly justify ascribing this meaning for 
"right'' to the nonutilitarian, on the basis of the man's mode of 
ethical reflection, since ex hypothesi the man's ethical principles are 
nonutilitarian. It seems, then, that a man cannot be forced into ac-
cepting certain ethical principles or modes of reasoning by appeal 
to his "implicit meanings" and the necessity of being consistent. 
For this effect, if one cannot appeal to his consciously intended 
meanings at the outset, it looks as if one must first convince him 
that certain questions are the important questions, the ones he 
wants to raise; in other words, one must persuade him in effect to 
accept a certain construction of his original question. How might 
one convince him of this? In parallel cases in the philosophy of 
science, when we are considering how to use "explanation" or 
"cause," at least part of the reason for adopting a certain construc-
tion of these terms consists in reviewing the advantages of using the 
terms in a certain way, of showing how such a use would fit in with 
the total conceptual structure. Similarly in ethics: whether a per-
son accepts a certain interpretation of his question will depend on 
considerations quite different from a review of his previous linguis-
tic habits; it will depend on considerations like those already men-
tioned- those I said a philosopher will take into account before he 
is satisfied with a given conceptual framework for ethics. 
Even if the two foregoing objections are unconvincing, however, 
there is a further difficulty for philosophers who wish to criticize 
ethical reasoning by appeal to the meanings of ordinary ethical 
words. For the meaning of these words, in whatever sense they have 
a meaning, must surely be supposed to differ from one speaker to 
another. Many philosophers have assumed that there is one single 
meaning or use of moral terms for important contexts, common to 
our speech-community. But this supposition ignores the extent to 
which a person's meanings are entwined with his total conceptual 
system. In general, as we learn or change our system of beliefs, our 
concepts change. Why should the same not be true for moral con-
cepts? Take for instance the moral concepts of religious people. 
Suppose a religious person says that what it means for an action to 
be morally obligatory is for it to be required by God's will for us. 
He supports this testimony by his deeds: in order to find his duty 
he prays, or searches Scripture; and when he becomes convinced 
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that something is God's will, that thing has supreme authority in 
his conduct, or if it does not he attributes the fact to his moral weak-
ness. Why should we not take him at his word and concede the re-
lation of his moral and theological conceptions? Philosophers have 
a neat dialectical device, whose use goes back perhaps to Plato, to 
prove that religious people are mistaken in such an explanation of 
their moral concepts. Philosophers refute the religious man to their 
satisfaction merely by raising the question whether it is or isn't true 
by definition that a right action is any action that God wills. The 
religious man is supposed to, and almost always will, concede that 
this proposition is not just true by definition, not just an unimpor-
tant tautology deriving from the meaning of "right," and hence 
admits that his explanation of meanings was incorrect. It is not 
clear, however, why he must give away his case by such an answer. 
And if he does, the most that is proved is that he is confused, and 
not that his moral concepts are really identical with those of Ber-
trand Russell. Or to take another case, suppose an unruly school 
boy from the East Side tells us that for some action to be wrong is 
for it to be one which will get one in trouble with the law or one's 
father or with the school authorities. Can we really go on to prove 
that he has the same moral concepts as Moore and Sidgwickr It is 
obvious that learning the English language guarantees certain things 
about the use of ethical words, specifically many interrelationships 
of terms like "duty," "ought.'' and "obligation." But I suggest that 
on the subtler points -what it is for something to be intrinsically 
good or right - there may be as much disparity of concepts as there 
is disparity of total conceptual schemes in which moral language is 
embedded. By what criterion of "same concept" may we say that 
such diverse types of mind are expressing the same concepts by their 
moral words? 
If I am right in this, then the moral philosopher who wishes 
analysis of language to set the stage for a methodology of ethics 
must be prepared to propose different methodologies for different 
people, depending on their wider conceptual schemes. It is, or may 
be, unwarranted to suppose that English usage commits us to one 
methodology for ethics. 
These considerations should be enough to give pause to a phi-
losopher who is tempted to give pride of place to the analysis of 
actual meanings of ethical words in his general theory of justifica-
tion in ethics. But there are two other serious questions about his 
philosophical program. 
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First, these philosophers aim to use the analysis of ethical lan-
guage as a device for criticizing ethical reflection, but in fact moral 
terms as actually used are rather blunt instruments which require 
to be sharpened for effective use. To be more explicit, when we re-
flect on the differences between vaTious types of situation, we realize 
that the things which moral terms can sensibly be used to say about 
them are ratl1er different. H ence, if one and t11e same word is to be 
used to make these clifTerent points, it must be capable of use in 
different senses in different contexts. But in fact there are no such 
recognized different senses of moral terms; and if one becomes clearly 
conscious of the different tl1ings that can sensibly be 1neam by them 
in different contexts, it is not by study of the English uses of the 
terms, but by the study of moral p hilosophy. One can master Eng-
lish perfectly well without learning these distinct senses at all. Moral 
language makes for confusion by fail ing to distinguish between 
questions that ought to be distinguished; and, as we shall see in a 
moment, it also sometimes confusingly labors distinctions that :ue 
without a difference. T hus moral tltinking cannot be rendered more 
effective by appeal to the meanings of ordinary moral language; 
what is needed for this purpose is rather reflection about the dilfer-
ences between situations and noticing what can sensibly be said 
about the different situ ations. 
Let me illustrate the point. Consider "wrong." Sometimes we 
say "lt would be wrong to do that," meaning to claim that a certain 
possible action is forbidden by sound moral principles. Sometimes 
we say, "It was '''rong of him to do tl1at," meaning to condemn the 
agent for a past action that we think he would not have perrormed 
but for a defect of character. Now if "is wrong" is to say these dif-
ferent things, it must possess corresponding different senses; but 
there are not recognized distinct senses o( this sort in English. There 
is only one sense of "wrong" recognized by dictionaries, which has 
to do both jobs. If we see clearly that there are two di[erent issues 
here, it is not simply because we have learned English. Moral lan-
guage does not separate the questions for us. Immanuel Kant pre-
sumably knew German, but he repeatedly failed to distinguish these 
very differences. The following argument is sometimes used by 
ordinary persons: "One is not acting wrongly if he sincerely thinks 
that what he does is his duty. Therefore if a person does what he 
th inks is his duty he is always doing t11e righ t thing." The existence 
of tltis argument has to be charged to the discredit o( English as a 
tool for reflection abou t ethical problems. 
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The opposite defect, which the English language also bears, is 
the laboring of distinctions without a significant difference. A prime 
example of this is the existence of the terms "duty," "obligation," 
and "wrong," all capable of being employed in moral contexts, in 
good English. These words are not exact synonyms: at least, we 
may say it is wrong to commit adultery or be cruel to an animal, 
but it sounds queer to say that we have a moral obligation not to 
commit adultery or be cruel to animals, or to say that this is our 
moral duty. But while the associations, linguistic ties, suggestions, 
and flavors of these words are different, it is not clear that there is 
a difference of substance between what one says with one and what 
one says with another. Yet the differences of the words are a stand-
ing temptation to suppose that there are corresponding differences 
of substance. C. H. Whiteley and others, for instance, have argued 
that something is a duty or obligation only if one has made a con-
tract or promise; and H. L.A. Hart has suggested that a person has 
a duty or obligation only when there is some other person who has 
a right. Now, even if these writers were correct in their accounts of 
what English permits us to say, we could still ask if there is some 
important sense in which we are free to he cruel to animals, it 
cruelty to animals is merely wrong but there is no obligation to re-
frain from it? It is hard to see that the difference of terminology 
makes any important point, or that it does anything hut obscure 
the moral similarity of the cases. 
If one turns to such words as "just" and "justice" one hardly 
knows whether to say that language has added a superfluous term 
which confuses matters by seeming to point to differences where 
there are none, or to complain that there is only one set of terms 
for covering a great many different situations which ought to be 
sharply distinguished. Either way, it is doubtful whether attention 
to the actual use of these terms will take us far toward making the 
conceptual distinctions it is important to make. 
Obviously, then, in many contexts the analysis of ordinary moral 
language can be of little help in criticizing moral principles and 
reasoning, because the English language itself needs reform before it 
is an efficient tool for clear moral thinking. 
There is a final reason why it is questionable whether a philos-
opher should begin with an analysis of actual meanings, and then 
proceed to develop a corresponding methodology for ascertaining 
whether terms like "good" and "right" apply. This reason is simply 
the fact that we are not bound to accept the view that the ultimate 
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aim of normative reasoning, or of moral philosophy, is to identify 
the situations in which moral terms in their ordinary senses are 
properly applied- in other words, to answer exactly the questions 
people raise in ordinary moral language. In other words, it is 
doubtful whether there is any point in knowing whether "good" 
or "right" in their ordinary senses apply to action or choice, pro-
vided these terms turn out to refer to something quite different from 
"rational" choice or preference in the sense described earlier. Why 
is this? 
At an earlier stage I pointed out that a "rational" choice or pref-
erence in my sense is one that would occur if one were fully and 
vividly aware of all the relevant available facts about the world and 
one's self, and were in a normal frame of mind. A choice or pref-
erence so made, I suggested, has been guided by the facts to the full 
extent. 
It is clear that we have a choice as moral philosophers: whether 
to recommend that a person make the best choice in the ordinary 
sense of "best," or the rational choice in my sense of "rational"; and 
whether to urge, say, that a person do what is morally obligatory in 
the ordinary sense of that phrase, or do what conforms, say, with 
the rules he would want written in the consciences of men if he 
were rational in my sense. 
Consider an example. Suppose I prefer to hear one orchestra 
program rather than another, in the situation that I know whatever 
facts might affect my preferences; my preference is then rational in 
my sense. But suppose someone claims that the opposite preference 
would be better. Perhaps this could not be shown; but since it is 
an empirical question how "better" is actually used as applied to 
such choice, it is logically possible that the opposite preference is 
the better one in the ordinary sense. The question then arises why 
one must recommend the preference that is "better." Is the fact that 
it is better a reason for adopting it? The fact that it would be better 
could not be a new empirical fact that would tend to move my 
preference in a certain way. for our definition o£ a "rational'' pref-
erence requires that it already have been formed in full view of all 
the relevant empirical facts, including whatever empirical fact is 
meant by "the other being better." One might, of course, say that 
some nonnatural fact is in question; but since it is not clear what 
kind of fact such a nonnatural fact might be, I shall ignore this 
possibility. I concede that perhaps it is tautologously true that it 
would be better to follow the better preference rather than the ra-
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tional one if there is conflict; but this, if true, only re-raises the 
initial question, why one should take an interest in the better rather 
than the more rational. It is also true that the expression "is the 
best thing" may have de facto authority over conduct in the sense 
that when we decide that something is "best" in the ordinary sense, 
our conditioned responses to the phrasing may be such that we in· 
cline to do the thing that we have judged best. It may well be that 
our conditioned responses are firmer and more favorable to "is the 
best thing" than to "is the rational thing" especially when ex-
plicitly understood in my sense. But it would be absurd for a per-
son to guide his conduct not by the facts but by the words which 
may properly be applied to it. My conclusion is that a more ra-
tional choice, in my sense, cannot in good reason take second place 
to a choice which is better in the ordinary sense, if tl1ere should be 
a conflict between the two. 
Much the same may be said for conduct which is properly called 
"morally obligatory" as contrasted, say, with conduct which would 
be required by the rules of a society which a rational person, in my 
sense, might want for his society. 
Once such questions are raised, it is clear that there is a difficult 
question to be answered, before we must assume that the job of the 
moral philosopher is to begin with the analysis of ordinary ethical 
words with the aim of determining to what things these words can 
properly be applied in their ordinary senses. 
• • • • • • • 
The foregoing queries about making the analysis of the actual 
meaning or use of ethical terms central in the enterprise of clarify-
ing the justification of attitudes and choices, and the methodology 
for ethics, are not intended to deny importance to the examination 
of the meanings of ethical words. Indeed, there is a sense in which 
the actual use of ordinary language is a test for the adequacy of any 
framework of concepts we might propose for ethics. For if we found, 
after we had become accustomed to use a set of concepts, that we 
still wanted to ask and answer questions framed in the terminology 
of ordinary language in its old sense, there would be reason to 
think that something was wrong with the proposed structure, and 
that modifications were in order. We can accept a point once made 
by Stevenson: if the philosopher has an adequate conceptual scheme 
there should be no need for relapsing into the use of ethical terms 
in some other and more familiar sense. 
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My critical remarks about the limitations of the place of analysis 
of actual meanings are also, very probably, more applicable to a 
theory of what philosophers ought to be doing than to their actual 
practice. Philosophers hardly ever make any inquiries of an em-
pirical sort into ordinary usage. The philosopher who says he is 
analyzing "ordinary language" in ethics is usually doing something 
more interesting than he describes it as being. In the first place, he 
is introspecting to determine his own usage- and his own usage 
has already been fumigated by what he knows about blind alleys 
in philosophy, and suffused by much general knowledge, as well as 
by awareness of many problems of which the ordinary man is igno-
rant. The philosopher's own usage is apt to reflect his own conclu-
sions about what questions can usefully be raised or answered in 
the realm of practice. Moreover, his definitions are likely to pre-
sent an orderly conceptual framework in which distinctions are 
made which he knows to be necessary, and which reflect a salutary 
preoccupation with philosophical psychology. So, in various ways, 
the practice of metaethical inquiry is apt to incorporate many ot 
the reforms I have been suggesting. But it seems worth while to 
recognize what metaethical inquiries should be, and to confess to 
ourselves that what they should be is something less simple than 
just a clarifying description of what ordinary questions mean. 
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The E. H. Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund was established 
in 1941 in memory of Ernest H. Lindley, Chancellor of the Univer-
sity of Kansas from 1920 to 1989. In February 1941 Mr. Roy Roberts, 
the chairman of the committee in charge. wrote in the Ckadtulte 
Magazine: 
The Lindley Memorial Lectureship Fund will be ad-
ministered by the Endowment Association. Each year it is 
proposed that the Chancellor should invite to the Univer-
sity for a lecture or a series of lectures, some outstanding 
national or world figure to speak on "Values of Living''-
just as the late Chancellor proposed to do in his courses 
"The Human Situation" and "Plan for Living." 
In the following June Mr. Roberts circulated a letter on behalf 
of the Committee, proposing a somewhat broader plan for the lec-
tureship: 
The income from this fund would be spent in a quest for 
social betterment by bringing to the University each year 
outstanding world leaders for a lecture or series of lectures, 
yet with a design so broad in its outline that in the years to 
come, if it is deemed wise, this Jiving memorial could take 
some more desirable form. 
The fund was allowed to accumulate until 1954, when Professor 
Richard McKeon lectured on "Human Rights and International 
Relations." He was followed a few years later by Professor Everett 
Hughes. The selection of lecturers, has been delegated to the De-
partment of Philosophy, which has chosen to adopt the flexible 
policy proposed in Mr. Roberts' letter, without forgetting the more 
explicit commitments suggested in his original article. 
The lectures for 1961 and 1962 have been published, and may 
be obtained from the Department of Philosophy at a price of fifty 
cents each. The proceeds from the sale have been devoted to the 
purchase of book prizes for outstanding students in introductory 
courses offered by the DepartmenL 
1961. "The Idea of Man- An Outline of Philosophical Anthro-
pology." 
By Jose Ferrater Mora, Professor of Philosophy, Bryn Mawr 
College. 
1962. "Changes in Events and Changes in Things." 
By A. N. Prior, Professor of Philosophy, University of Man-
chester. 
